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INTRODUCTION 
Insurance law scholars often analyze the forms and functions of insurance and 
discuss the various ways that insurance institutions (i.e., insurance companies, 
brokers, and agents) impact society.1 The traditional and dominant conception of 
insurance is as a voluntary contractual agreement that transfers a risk of loss to a 
party whose business is selling such contracts.2 However, insurance scholars also 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine.  This article was first presented as part of 
the 2014 Insurance and Legal Regulation Conference held at UC Irvine School of Law. The author 
would like to thank Kevin Royer for research assistance on this project and the UC Irvine School of 
Law for providing the funding to support this project. 
1. See generally Spencer L. Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry in the 
Theory of Insurance Law, 45 MINN. L. REV. 471 (1961) (highlighting various approaches to thinking about 
insurance law). 
2. For a comprehensive explanation of insurance as contract, see Kenneth S. Abraham, Four 
Conceptions of Insurance, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 658–68 (2013) and TOM BAKER & KYLE D. LOGUE, 
INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 31–32 (3d ed. 2013). The insurance contract 
between an individual policyholder and an insurer is subject to the law of contracts. Of course, many 
insurance policies are written on standard forms that are usually considered adhesive contracts. See 
Abraham, supra, at 660. But see generally Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standard Insurance Policies, 78 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1263 (2011) (showing that policy terms are not always the same). Insurance regulations attempt 
to adjust the insureds’ unequal bargaining power by requiring premarket approval of insurance policy 
terms. Though not always successful, courts also attempt to clarify policy provisions and nudge insurers 
toward crafting clearer policy provisions and terms. See BAKER & LOGUE, supra, at 38–41. 
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examine how insurance functions in society as regulation,3 governance,4 a public 
utility,5 and a product.6 In addition to serving as a basis for knowledge production7 
and capital accumulation and allocation,8 insurance increases and decreases social 
stratification in society.9 Within these frameworks, scholars often draw from law 
 
3. For a comprehensive explanation of the concept of insurance as regulation, see generally 
Tom Baker, Insurance and the Law, 11 INT’L ENCYCLOPEDIA SOC. & BEHAV. SCI. 7587 (2002); Tom 
Baker, Insurance in Sociolegal Research, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 433 (2001) [hereinafter Baker, Sociolegal 
Research]. See also Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, How Insurance Substitutes for Regulation, 
REGULATION, Spring 2013, at 36 [hereinafter Ben-Shahar & Logue, Substitutes for Regulation], available at 
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2013/3/v36n1-10.pdf [http://
perma.cc/CN2U-ZTN8]; Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance 
Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197 (2012). Insurance regulates many aspects of our lives. 
Insurance companies establish the underwriting criteria and standards and charge premiums. These 
mechanisms allow insurance companies to act as gatekeepers and control who can or cannot obtain 
insurance. See Ben-Shahar & Logue, Substitutes for Regulation, supra, at 37–42. See generally Baker, Sociolegal 
Research, supra. Through insurance policy terms and pricing, insurance companies also establish norms 
of conduct. Private insurance policies for life, health, and property often take the form of private 
legislation or regulation through exclusions and conditions. In addition to serving a gatekeeping 
function, liability insurance acts as a form of tort regulation and, in doing so, finances the civil litigation 
system. See Tom Baker, Liability Insurance as Tort Regulation: Six Ways that Liability Insurance Shapes Tort 
Law in Action, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 13 (2005) (“[L]iability insurance is a de facto element of tort law, . . . 
[and a] de facto cap[ ] on tort damages . . . .”). See generally KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY 
CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT LAW FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11 (2008) (exploring how 
both first-party and third-party liability insurance influenced the development of tort liability); Stephen 
C. Yeazell, Re-financing Civil Litigation, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 183 (2002) (highlighting how insurance and 
credit finance the civil litigation system). 
4. For a comprehensive explanation of how insurance institutions, forms, technologies, and 
visions function as a form of governance beyond the state, see RICHARD V. ERICSON, AARON DOYLE 
& DEAN BARRY, INSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE 3–9 (2003). Scholars adopting an insurance-as-
governance framework understand insurance as an institutional force that affects individuals, 
organizations, and institutions inside and outside the insurance industry. See id. at 9–10 (explaining nine 
interconnected dimensions through which insurance governs society). Similar to states, the private 
insurance industry often engages in “sharing similar goals of security and solidarity through the pooling 
of risks; using similar techniques for governing at a distance; and collaborating in insurance regimes.” 
Id. at 65. The private insurance industry provides technologies and social arrangements for allocating 
risk across pools of risk takers, and establishes preventative security arrangements that try to reduce 
fraud, minimize harm and loss to its citizens. The private insurance industry also uses many of the same 
methods as the state to achieve its goals, such as surveillance, underwriting, and claims. See id. at 12–17. 
5. See Abraham, supra note 2, at 668–73 (discussing the public utility conception of insurance). 
6. See id. at 673–83 (discussing the product conception of insurance). 
7. BAKER & LOGUE, supra note 2, at 16 (highlighting how insurance institutions accumulate and 
allocate capital). 
8. Id. at 15 (highlighting how insurance institutions acquire information). 
9. Insurance law scholar Tom Baker argues that “[t]he social stratification function of insurance 
is a more generalized way of thinking about the dynamic that makes insurance companies gatekeepers.” 
TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 10 (2d ed. 2008). 
The relationship between insurance and law in society is often mediated by insurance institutions, 
namely, insurance companies. Those individuals who cannot obtain insurance from insurance 
companies occupy a different social position than those who are able to obtain insurance. Adverse 
selection or “cream skimming” of good risks by insurers leaves those most in need of insurance without 
being able to obtain coverage. See id. at 6–7; see also Tom Baker, Risk, Insurance, and the Social Construction 
of Responsibility, in EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY 
33, 34, 47–48 (Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon eds., 2002). Conversely, insurance laws and regulatory 
schemes sometimes allow insurance companies to ameliorate social stratification and consequently 
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and economics principles to understand insurance company and insured behavior.10 
Analyses of insurance law view law as “top-down” and exogenous to the insurance 
institutions that draft, market, and sell insurance. In other words, law is treated as 
formed and defined outside of insurance institutions by courts, legislatures, and 
administrative agencies, and the role of the insurance industry is limited to reacting 
to law by either complying or not complying with law often due to rational, strategic 
considerations.11 By exploring how and why insurance impacts society, and why 
insurance companies wield considerable influence in society, insurance law scholars 
lay an excellent foundation for thinking about insurance and insurance institutions. 
While existing approaches are helpful, there is not an insurance theory anchored in 
organizational behavior, culture, and decision making that explains how insurance 
companies respond to law. 
This Article suggests that the relationship between legal regulation and 
insurance institutions is more “bottom-up” than we think.12 The interaction 
between insurance companies and legal regulation is best illustrated not by 
examining the forms or functions of insurance or the insurance industry’s broad 
impact on society, but rather through a processual model in which insurance 
organizations influence not just private law but public law. This Article, therefore, 
offers a theory that explains insurance industry behavior and, in particular, how 
insurance companies respond to laws in ways that end up influencing the meaning 
of law, not just in insurance companies’ own legal environment, but also among 
public legal institutions such as courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I draws from new institutional 
organizational sociology research and offers a theoretical framework for 
understanding organizational responses to legal regulation as a process that specifies 
the institutional and political mechanisms through which organizations shape the 
content and meaning of law.13 To help understand how the new institutional 
theoretical approach has been used to explain organizational responses to law in 
other contexts, I discuss prior empirical work in this area, especially in the civil and 
consumer-rights contexts. These studies reveal how ambiguous civil rights 
legislation led a majority of employers to create a variety of symbolic forms of 
compliance that, despite being more focused on managerial prerogatives than on 
 
serve the public interest. See generally Shauhin Talesh, Insurance Law as Public Interest Law, 2 U.C. IRVINE 
L. REV. 985 (2012). 
10. Of course, this is not to suggest that law and economics is the only framework used. There 
are certainly other approaches. However, it is safe to say that law and economics rationales dominate 
thinking on insurance. 
11. See supra notes 2–9 and accompanying text. 
12. For further conceptualization of the idea that the relationship between organizations and 
compliance with legal regulation as “bottom-up,” see generally Lauren B. Edelman & Shauhin A. 
Talesh, To Comply or Not to Comply—That Isn’t the Question: How Organizations Construct the Meaning of 
Compliance, in EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS RESPONSES TO REGULATION 103 (Christine 
Parker & Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen eds., 2011). 
13. See infra notes 18–42 and accompanying text. 
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legal ideals, were incorporated into judicial opinions interpreting civil rights law.14 
In particular, these studies note how managerial values such as rationality, 
efficiency, and maintaining decision-making discretion and flexibility influence the 
way in which organizations understand law and compliance. Just as judges 
incorporate institutionalized organizational practices into their decisions, other 
studies show how legislators and regulators incorporate organizations’ 
institutionalized forms of compliance that are influenced by managerial values into 
consumer protection legislation and regulations.15 However, because organizations 
directly interact with legislators and regulators, institutional and political 
mechanisms drive the manner in which organizations conceptualize compliance in 
ways that ultimately shape the meaning of law regulating organizations. 
After setting forth this theoretical framework, Part II applies this theory to a 
series of case studies and explains how insurance institutions respond to legal 
regulations in ways that end up shaping the content and meaning of many laws that 
are designed to regulate them.16 Similar to studies in other contexts, institutionalized 
logics within the field of insurance organizations and direct political mobilization 
work hand in hand as the insurance field influences legislation, regulation, and court 
decisions. However, unlike prior studies in other contexts that focus on managerial 
values, insurance institutions use a risk-based logic in addition to adhering to 
managerial values. In the insurance context, risk and managerial values work in a 
complementary manner. I show how insurance institutions construct the meaning 
of compliance with antidiscrimination laws through drafting, marketing, and selling 
Employment Practice Liability Insurance; use the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners to influence legislation and regulation; and shape the nature of 
property insurance regulatory frameworks.17 I also show how insurance institutions 
influence the nature of insurance regulation in Canada. In doing so, I refine how 
the new institutional framework applies in the insurance context to account for the 
logic of risk. My examples collectively illustrate that although laws regulating 
insurance institutions appear top-down, insurance institutions are actually shaping 
the content and meaning of laws that are designed to regulate them in very 
important and powerful ways. 
This Article concludes by discussing the implications of my theory for studies 
on the relationship between insurance and legal regulation. Although prevailing 
theories of the forms and functions of insurance reveal the intertwined relationship 
between insurance and law, my new institutional theory of insurance helps reveal a 
missing part of the way that insurance institutions impact law in society. In 
particular, my new institutional theory of insurance offers a framework for 
understanding how institutionalized practices and norms among similar or 
likeminded organizations influence the way that law is interpreted and implemented 
 
14. See infra notes 39–41 and accompanying text. 
15. See infra notes 37–39 and accompanying text. 
16. See infra notes 43–163 and accompanying text. 
17. See infra notes 43–163 and accompanying text. 
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among public legal institutions. In doing so, I offer a different lens through which 
empirical research of insurance and insurance institutions can be conducted going 
forward. 
I. NEW INSTITUTIONAL THEORIES OF LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS 
Drawing from new institutional organizational sociology studies of law and 
organizations, this Part articulates a theoretical framework for understanding how 
organizations respond to law. I specify the institutional and political mechanisms 
through which private organizations influence law. New institutional organizational 
sociologists challenge the idea that organizations simply resist, obey, or avoid law in 
a way that yields the most rational or cost-benefit outcome.18 New institutionalists 
argue that rationality is socially constructed by nonmarket factors such as widely 
accepted norms and patterns of behavior that become taken for granted and 
institutionalized among the community of organizations that make up an 
organizational field.19 An “organizational field” refers to the subset of the 
environment that is most closely relevant to a given organization, including 
suppliers, competitors, and customers, as well as flows of influence, 
communication, and innovation.20 Just as organizations exist within broader 
organizational fields, legal organizations such as courts, legislatures, and 
administrative agencies exist within legal fields.21 Legal fields are institutional 
environments within which ideas about law evolve, are exchanged, and become 
institutionalized.22 Ideas about rational legal behavior, including how to respond to 
legal regulation, tend to evolve and, in some cases, become institutionalized within 
legal fields.23 
New institutionalists studying the relationship between law and organizations 
often start with the basic premise that there is nearly always some degree of legal 
 
18. See Diane Vaughan, Rational Choice, Situated Action, and the Social Control of Organizations, 32 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 23, 23–33 (1998) (highlighting both traditional rational choice models and calling 
for different approaches). 
19. For a series of books and articles that lay out the general new institutional model that focuses 
on institutionalized norms operating within the organizational field, see generally W. RICHARD SCOTT, 
INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS (2d ed. 2001); THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN 
ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991); Paul J. DiMaggio & 
Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational 
Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147 (1983); John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal 
Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340 (1977). 
20. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 19, at 148–52 (defining and discussing how 
organizational fields provide a better unit of analysis than one organization). 
21. See Lauren B. Edelman, Overlapping Fields and Constructed Legalities: The Endogeneity of Law, in 
PRIVATE EQUITY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE DYNAMICS OF CAPITAL MARKET 
REGULATION 55, 58 ( Justin O’Brien ed., 2007) (defining legal fields as “the environment within which 
legal institutions and legal actors interact and in which conceptions of legality and compliance evolve”). 
22. See id. 
23. See id. 
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ambiguity in laws regulating organizations.24 This ambiguity in legal regulation 
leaves a space for the social construction of the meaning of law through a blending 
of, and sometimes contest between, the logics of legal and organizational fields.25 
In these situations, organizations respond by creating written rules, policies, and 
procedures that fill in law’s meaning.26 As organizations legalize themselves, 
managerial and business values such as rationality, efficiency, and discretion come 
to influence the way in which organizations understand law and compliance.27 That 
is, organizations struggle to find rational modes of response to legal complexity and 
ambiguity and devise strategies to preserve managerial discretion and authority 
while at the same time maximizing the appearance of compliance with legal 
principles.28 
Prior new institutional research shows that business, management, and legal 
professionals are key carriers of ideas among and across organizational fields. In 
particular, human resource officials, personnel managers, management consultants, 
and in-house lawyers communicate ideas about law as they move among 
organizations; participate in conferences, workshops, training sessions, and 
professional networking meetings; and publish professional personnel literature.29 
 
24. See Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil 
Rights Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1531, 1535–38 (1992) (discussing ambiguities in law, especially in context of 
civil rights laws). Edelman highlights how the regulations implementing Title VII contain workforce 
composition reporting requirements, but do not require specific alteration of personnel policies or 
procedures. See id. at 1537. 
25. See Edelman, supra note 21, at 58–65 (discussing how law is constructed by actors operating 
at intersection of overlapping legal and organizational fields); see also Shauhin A. Talesh, The Privatization 
of Public Legal Rights: How Manufacturers Construct the Meaning of Consumer Law, 43 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 527, 
533–35 (2009) [hereinafter Talesh, Public Legal Rights]. See generally Shauhin A. Talesh, Institutional and 
Political Sources of Legislative Change: Explaining how Private Organizations Influence the Form and Content of 
Consumer Protection Legislation, 39 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 973 (2014) [hereinafter Talesh, Institutional and 
Political Sources] (showing how multiple logics can influence organizational fields). 
26. See Lauren B. Edelman et al., When Organizations Rule: Judicial Deference to Institutionalized 
Employment Structures, 117 AM. J. SOC. 888, 898–900 (2011) (discussing legalization of organizational 
fields); see also Talesh, Public Legal Rights, supra note 25, at 533 (“In response to antidiscrimination laws 
that alter the ‘legal environment,’ organizations often adopt many legal practices and structures because 
their cultural environment constructs adoption as the legitimate or natural thing to do.”). 
27. See Shauhin A. Talesh, How Dispute Resolution System Design Matters: An Organizational Analysis 
of Dispute Resolution Structures and Consumer Lemon Laws, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 463, 469 (2012) (“[L]aw 
becomes ‘managerialized’ when business values such as rationality, efficiency, and management 
discretion operating within an organizational field influence the way organizations understand law, 
legality, and compliance.”). 
28. See Edelman, supra note 24, at 1567–69 (finding that organizations created policies and 
procedures in ways that preserved managerial discretion). See generally Lauren B. Edelman, Sally Riggs 
Fuller & Iona Mara-Drita, Diversity Rhetoric and the Managerialization of Law, 106 AM. J. SOC. 1589 (2001) 
(examining how managerial rhetoric about diversity influences employers’ employment policies and 
procedures). 
29. For a series of studies highlighting how the professions mediate and managerialize law, see 
generally SANFORD M. JACOBY, EMPLOYING BUREAUCRACY: MANAGERS, UNIONS, AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF WORK IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY, 1900–1945 (1985); James N. Baron, Frank R. 
Dobbin & P. Devereaux Jennings, War and Peace: The Evolution of Modern Personnel Administration in U.S. 
Industry, 92 AM. J. SOC. 350 (1986); Lauren B. Edelman, Howard S. Erlanger & John Lande, Internal 
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Existing empirical research reveals that when organizations attempt to comply with 
laws, managerial conceptions of law broaden the term “diversity” in a way that 
disassociates it from its original goal of protecting civil rights,30 transform sexual 
harassment claims into personality conflicts,31 deflect or discourage complaints 
rather than offering informal resolution,32 and even shape the way arbitrators 
understand law and compliance.33 
The process through which organizational ideas about compliance evolve 
occurs when taken-for-granted norms and cognitive ideas become so strongly 
institutionalized that they are not widely challenged. But as organizations struggle 
to define the meaning of compliance, that process may also be contested as the 
logics of organizational and legal fields come into conflict.34 Contests over the 
meaning of compliance are particularly likely where multiple interest groups have 
stakes in the meaning of compliance.35 Political battles over legal meaning are 
particularly salient in the legislative and administrative contexts, where interest 
groups engage in overt battles regarding the meaning of compliance.36 In the 
 
Dispute Resolution: The Transformation of Civil Rights in the Workplace, 27 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 497 (1993); 
Edelman, Fuller & Mara-Drita, supra note 28. 
30. See Edelman, Fuller & Mara-Drita, supra note 28, at 1590 (showing how professional 
personnel literature broadens how the term “diversity” is used in relation to discrimination claims). 
31. See Edelman, Erlanger & Lande, supra note 29, at 516–17 (showing how grievance and 
antiharassment officers transform legal disputes into interpersonal disputes and focus on healing the 
relationship). 
32. See generally Anna-Maria Marshall, Idle Rights: Employees’ Rights Consciousness and the Construction 
of Sexual Harassment Policies, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 83 (2005) (showing how sexual harassment policies 
are constructed through a managerial lens). 
33. See Talesh, supra note 27, at 469 (showing how business and consumer values influence the 
way that private arbitration dispute resolution systems are designed). 
34. See, e.g., Edelman et al., supra note 26, at 930–34 (highlighting how courts defer to the 
presence of employer structures as evidence of compliance); Lauren B. Edelman & Robin Stryker, A 
Sociological Approach to Law and the Economy, in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 527 (Neil 
J. Smelser & Richard Swedberg eds., 2d ed. 2005) (discussing political contestation); Carol A. Heimer, 
Competing Institutions: Law, Medicine, and Family in Neonatal Intensive Care, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 17 (1999) 
(highlighting the overlap of legal and medical values); Nicholas Pedriana & Robin Stryker, Political 
Culture Wars 1960s Style: Equal Opportunity—Affirmative Action Law and the Philadelphia Plan, 103 AM. J. 
SOC. 633 (1997) (highlighting political contestation among competing groups); Marc Schneiberg & 
Sarah A. Soule, Institutionalization as a Contested, Multilevel Process: The Case of Rate Regulation in American 
Fire Insurance, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND ORGANIZATION THEORY 122 (Gerald F. Davis et al. eds., 
2005) (showing how fire insurance rate regulation was the product of political, legal, and business 
contestation); Talesh, Public Legal Rights, supra note 25, at 539–51 (highlighting how manufacturers 
influence the meaning of legislation). 
35. See Edelman & Stryker, supra note 34, at 527–37 (discussing the relationship between 
institutional and political contestation); Talesh, Institutional and Political Sources, supra note 25, at 985–97 
(providing a comparative empirical analysis of how differences in the political mobilization at the 
legislative level can lead to two different consumer warranty laws); Talesh, Public Legal Rights, supra note 
25, at 539–51 (highlighting the political contestation over California’s lemon law). 
36. See Pedriana & Stryker, supra note 34, at 633–91 (revealing political contestation among 
competing groups); Nicholas Pedriana & Robin Stryker, The Strength of a Weak Agency: Enforcement of Title 
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Expansion of State Capacity, 1965–1971, 110 AM. J. SOC. 709 (2004) 
(showing how institutional and political factors influence state policy); Talesh, Institutional and Political 
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legislative, administrative, and judicial contexts, forms of compliance that tend to 
acquire an aura of rationality in both organizational and legal fields are those that 
preserve managerial authority and discretion, while simultaneously realizing or 
appearing to realize the legal principle of due process.37 
The infusion of managerial logics into law is not limited to organizations or 
organizational fields. New institutionalists show how law becomes endogenous as 
legal rules derived from court cases, legislation, and administrative regulations come 
to be determined by organizations—the very group such laws are designed to 
regulate.38 For example, empirical work in the civil rights context shows how 
ambiguous civil rights legislation led employers to create a variety of symbolic forms 
of compliance that, despite being more attentive to managerial prerogatives than to 
legal ideas, were incorporated into judicial opinions interpreting civil rights law.39 
My own empirical research demonstrates how institutionalized logics operating 
among automobile manufacturers play an important role in determining the form 
and structure of consumer protection legislation and regulation.40 In particular, 
although political mobilization and contestation remain prevalent in the legislative 
process, the political frames used by organizations lobbying the legislature reflect 
logics that are derived from institutionalized norms and structures developed by 
these same organizations.41 In sum, through some combination of institutional 
logics and political contestation, private organizations are able to shape the content 
and meaning of laws that are designed to regulate them. 
Thus, it appears that new institutional theories and studies of insurance law 
are ripe to be blended together. While insurance law scholars examine the forms 
and functions of insurance, there is little empirical research directed toward 
understanding the organizational behavior, culture, and decision making of 
insurance institutions. Conversely, existing new institutional research on law and 
 
Sources, supra note 25, at 984–96 (highlighting how institutional logics drive political contestation to 
varying degrees). 
37. See Edelman & Talesh, supra note 12, at 104–13 (combining institutional approaches to 
explain how private organizations shape the content and meaning of law among public legal 
institutions). 
38. For a comprehensive explanation of this theory, see id. 
39. See, e.g., Edelman et al., supra note 26, at 891, 922–31(showing how courts defer to 
employers’ institutionalized practices); Lauren B. Edelman, Christopher Uggen & Howard S. Erlanger, 
The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. SOC. 406, 407–08, 432–
46 (1999) (same). 
40. See Talesh, supra note 27, at 475–84 (showing how despite having similar consumer warranty 
laws, the law in action is different based on the way that business and consumer perspectives are 
accounted for in the design of the dispute resolution system); Talesh, Institutional and Political Sources, 
supra note 25, at 973–1005 (highlighting how businesses influence legislation in some, but not all, 
circumstances based on various political alliances that are mobilized during the legislative process); 
Talesh, Public Legal Rights, supra note 25, at 539–50 (in response to powerful consumer protection 
legislation affording consumers rights and remedies in court, manufacturers created private dispute 
resolution structures and ultimately convinced the legislature to adopt them into law). 
41. See Talesh, Public Legal Rights, supra note 25, at 552 (“[T]he politics of consumer protection 
policy and what manufacturers lobby for are, at least partially, institutionally determined and rooted 
within the logic of organizational fields.”). 
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organizations suggests that human resource officials, managers, and in-house 
counsel influence the meaning of antidiscrimination law by communicating an 
altered ideology, infused with managerial values, of what civil rights laws mean. 
While the new institutional framework has been applied in a variety of contexts, 
with a few exceptions, there has not been a concerted effort to apply the theoretical 
framework to studies of insurance.42 In particular, new institutionalists have not 
focused on how insurance companies use insurance and risk-based logics and 
principles to influence the nature of law and compliance. 
II. HOW INSURANCE COMPANIES INFLUENCE THE CONTENT  
AND MEANING OF LAW 
This Part develops what I refer to as “a new institutional theory of insurance.” 
I offer a theoretically-informed explanation of how the insurance industry responds 
to law from an organizational behavior, culture, and decision-making context. In 
particular, the insurance field’s institutionalized logics and political mobilization 
mediate and, at times, influence what law and compliance mean among private 
organizations, but they also shape the content and meaning of legislation, regulation, 
and court decisions. My inquiry specifically focuses on how the insurance field 
shapes particular lines of insurance such as employment practice liability and 
property insurance. However, I also focus on how insurance institutions influence 
foreign and domestic intermediary organizations that are tasked with shaping 
insurance regulatory policy. 
A. How Insurance Companies Influence the Content and Meaning of Law  
Among Public Legal Institutions 
The rise of Employment Practice Liability Insurance (EPLI) illustrates how 
insurance institutions mediate the meaning of compliance with civil rights legislation 
and how these constructions of compliance end up being deferred to and 
legitimated by public legal institutions. Prior to the development of employment 
 
42. Marc Schneiberg has conducted a few projects looking at “bottom-up” constructions of law 
in the insurance context. See, e.g., Marc Schneiberg, Combining New Institutionalisms: Explaining Institutional 
Change in American Property Insurance, 20 SOC. F. 93 (2005) [hereinafter Schneiberg, New Institutionalisms] 
(property insurance); Marc Schneiberg, Political and Institutional Conditions for Governance by Association: 
Private Order and Price Controls in American Fire Insurance, 27 POL. & SOC’Y 67 (1999) (fire insurance). For 
other studies looking at how private organizations shape the content and meaning of public legal 
institutions, see, for example, Valerie Jenness & Ryken Grattet, The Law-In-Between: The Effects of 
Organizational Perviousness on the Policing of Hate Crime, 52 SOC. PROBS. 337 (2005) (criminal justice); 
Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L. REV. 
487 (2003) (securities regulation); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Organizational Misconduct: Beyond the Principal-
Agent Model, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 571 (2005) (securities regulation); Justin O’Brien, Introduction: The 
Dynamics of Capital Market Governance, in PRIVATE EQUITY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE 
DYNAMICS OF CAPITAL MARKET REGULATION 1, 1–17 ( Justin O’Brien ed., 2007) (securities 
regulation); Nancy Reichman, Moving Backstage: Uncovering the Role of Compliance Practices in Shaping 
Regulatory Policy, in WHITE-COLLAR CRIME RECONSIDERED 244 (Kip Schlegel & David Weisburd eds., 
1992). 
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discrimination law, workers suffering workplace discrimination rarely sought or 
took action in the legal system.43 Title VII and other civil rights laws attempt to 
convert the broad guarantees established by the U.S. Constitution into tangible 
legislation that addresses the specific issue of workplace discrimination and 
harassment.44 
In response to perceived threats of employment discrimination lawsuits, 
insurance companies began offering EPLI. Whereas previous forms of business 
insurance expressly excluded coverage for liability arising out of employment 
practices, EPLI filled this gap by providing employers with the means to manage 
the increasing litigation risk associated with discrimination, sexual harassment, 
wrongful termination, and other breaches of employment law.45 EPLI policies 
provide insurance defense and indemnification coverage to employers for claims of 
discrimination (e.g., age, sex, race, disability), and other employment-related 
allegations made by employees, former employees, or potential employees.46 
Consistent with new institutional studies, diffusion of EPLI occurred both 
among insurers and employers. While only a couple insurance companies in the 
1990s offered EPLI, over seventy insurance companies offer EPLI today.47 The 
majority of large employers and many midsize employers purchase EPLI.48 Thus, 
while EPLI has become an institutionalized practice both among insurers and 
employers, until recently little attention has been paid to examining how the 
 
43. Joan Gabel, et al., Evolving Conflict Between Standards for Employment Discrimination Liability and 
the Delegation of That Liability: Does Employment Practices Liability Insurance Offer Appropriate Risk Transference?, 
4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 5 (2001) (noting that litigating over discrimination is a relatively recent 
phenomenon). 
44. Title VII in particular states in relevant part: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against 
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin . . . . 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012); see also Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 
No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994)) (emphasizing the 
deterrent effect of financial liability by providing compensatory and punitive damages for disparate 
treatment lawsuits brought by private plaintiffs). See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
45. See Joan T.A. Gabel, Nancy R. Mansfield & Gregory Todd Jones, The Peculiar Moral Hazard 
of Employment Practices Liability Insurance: Realignment of the Incentive to Transfer Risk with the Incentive to Prevent 
Discrimination, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 639, 640, 650–51 (2006) (highlighting the 
rise of EPLI); see also Gabel et al., supra note 43, at 28–30 (same). 
46. See Nancy H. Van der Veer, Note, Employment Practices Liability Insurance: Are EPLI Policies a 
License to Discriminate? Or Are They a Necessary Reality Check for Employers?, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 173, 175–
77 (2005) (explaining what EPLI is and what it covers). 
47. See Gabel et al., supra note 43, at 28 (tracing the history of EPLI); see also Glenn Kramer, 
Reasonableness for Free: Why Buy Employment Practices Liability Insurance When EEOC.gov Gives Protection 
Away?, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 459, 459–63 (same). 
48. See Gabel et al., supra note 43, at 28 (“It is estimated that more than half of Fortune 500 
companies have purchased EPLI coverage.”). “The volume of business (gross written premium) 
continues to be stuck at about $1.6 billion in the United States, and perhaps another $500–550 million 
outside the U.S.” Richard S. Betterley, Employment Practices Liability Insurance Market Survey 2012: Rates 
Continue to Firm, but Not for All Carriers, THE BETTERLEY REPORT (Betterley Risk Consultants, Sterling, 
M.A.), Dec. 2012, at 6. 
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insurance field mediates or translates the meaning of compliance with 
antidiscrimination law to those that insurance institutions interact with when they 
draft, market, and sell EPLI. 
Building on prior new institutional research, I conducted a qualitative 
empirical study for the past three years that explores how the insurance field 
(insurance companies, agents, brokers, and risk management consultants), through 
EPLI and the accompanying risk management services that the field offers, 
construct the threat of employment law and influence the nature of civil rights 
compliance.49 Drawing from participant observation and ethnographic interviews 
at EPLI conferences across the country as well as content analysis of EPLI policies, 
loss-prevention manuals, EPLI industry guidelines, and webinars, my empirical data 
suggest that insurance companies and institutions use a risk-based logic and 
institutionalize a way of thinking centered around risk management and reduction.50 
Faced with uncertain and unpredictable legal risk concerning potential 
discrimination violations, insurance institutions elevate the risk and threat in the 
legal environment and offer a series of risk-management services that they argue 
will avert risk for employers that purchase EPLI.51 By framing employers’ legal 
environment in terms of uncertain legal risk,52 heightened litigation risk,53 and the 
 
49. For a more elaborate analysis of the empirical study that I conducted, see Shauhin Talesh, 
Legal Intermediaries: How Insurance Companies Construct the Meaning of Compliance with Antidiscrimination Laws, 
37 LAW & POL’Y 209–39 (2015). 
50. See id. 
51. See id. tbls.1, 2, 3 & 4 (highlighting a series of examples of how insurers frame legal risk as 
uncertain, heighten litigation risk, and encourage reducing risk). 
52. Uncertain legal risk refers to the risk of loss to an organization based on some violation of 
law. My empirical research reveals that insurers frame employers’ legal risk as uncertain, vague, and 
unpredictable. See Talesh, supra note 49, at 218–19. The EPL Book, the leading EPLI manual used by 
industry field actors, repeatedly notes the vague and unpredictable state of employment law: “While 
two states may each prohibit discrimination on a particular basis, the extent of the protection afforded, 
the process for the employee to make a claim and the possible remedies available against the employer 
may vary widely.” GARY W. GRIFFIN ET AL., THE EPL BOOK: THE PRACTICAL GUIDE TO 
EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES LIABILITY AND INSURANCE 17 (3d ed. 2001). “The only consistent and 
reliable aspect of personnel laws and regulations is that they are in constant state of flux. Federal and 
state legislatures frequently enact new legislation and amend existing statutes. Courts continuously 
reinterpret the meaning of established labor laws.” Id. at 88, 91. “Even human resource professionals 
can be frustrated when they attempt to make sense of labor laws that contradict each other.” Id. at 91. 
For further analysis of how the insurer field frames employers’ legal risk as uncertain, see Talesh, supra 
note 49, at 218–19. 
53. Insurance field actors heighten the litigation risk facing employers by routinely discussing 
the growth, burden, and cost of employment lawsuits in documentary data and webinars: “Not-for-
profit corporations and public entities, in addition to public and private businesses, are experiencing an 
explosion of employment-related claims.” GRIFFIN ET AL., supra note 52, at 1. “The Supreme Court’s 
decisions in these cases signal an increased likelihood that an organization may be held vicariously liable 
for sexual harassment committed by supervisors and managers.” Id. at 7. “In light of today’s increasingly 
litigious environment, it is not unusual to find a variety of common-law tort, quasi contract, or other 
state law claims attached to a complaint alleging discrimination, sexual harassment, or wrongful 
discharge.” Id. at 35. For further analysis of how the insurer field heightens employers’ litigation risk, 
see Talesh, supra note 49, at 219–21. 
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need for risk reduction,54 the insurance field creates a space to encourage employers 
to engage in managerialized responses and develop formalized procedures by using 
the various risk-management services offered by insurers to help mitigate these 
risks. In this setting, risk and managerial values work in a complementary manner. 
After analyzing the uncertain legal risks employers face and the high likelihood 
that employers are going to be sued, my fieldwork reveals that insurers encourage 
employers to purchase EPLI because these insurance policies and the value-added 
risk management services that insurers offer will reduce employers’ risk.55 In 
particular, EPLI insurers offer risk-management services to employers, including 
conducting compliance audits of employers, offering employers a confidential legal 
hotline that allows employers to ask legal questions to insurer-sponsored lawyers, 
and providing employee handbooks and employment “contract builders” to 
employers so that they can construct a handbook and develop contracts without 
actually drafting the documents.56 These risk-management services can have 
positive and negative impacts on compliance: they may reflect some “best practices” 
and lead to improved employment policies and procedures, but they may also make 
it easier for employers to develop policies and procedures without actively 
participating in the creation of these policies and procedures.57 
Insurers influence the meaning of compliance with antidiscrimination laws in 
a number of ways. First, conferences, training programs, loss-prevention manuals, 
and insurance policy language provide an opportunity for the insurance field actors 
to build discretion into legal rules. By “building discretion into legal rules,” I mean 
that insurance companies develop policy language that provides work-arounds to 
certain legal rules that clearly forbid insurance coverage for certain acts or omissions 
in civil rights contexts. For example, the insurability of punitive damages highlights 
how the insurance field builds discretion into legal rules. Even though civil rights 
laws often potentially subject employers to punitive damages, and many states 
 
54. Once the insurance field frames the legal risks facing employers as uncertain but elevated 
and likely to occur, the insurance field encourages employers and risk management consultants to avert 
or reduce this risk by purchasing EPLI insurance and the accompanying risk-management services: 
“But because the frequency and severity of EPL claims is rising, the importance of a coordinated risk 
management approach, including the consideration of specialized EPL insurance, should not be 
overlooked.” GRIFFIN ET AL., supra note 52, at 70. My participation at EPLI conferences and analysis 
of EPLI webinars reveal that the insurance field follows almost a uniform formula: discuss the vague, 
complex, and uncertain legal risks facing employers; discuss the growth, costs, and inevitability of 
lawsuits; and then discuss how to reduce employment practice liability exposure by purchasing EPLI. 
See Talesh, supra note 49, at 221. For further analysis of how the insurer field encourages employers to 
reduce and avert risk by purchasing EPLI, see id., at 221–23. 
55. See  id. at 223–31. 
56. See id. at 223 (discussing risk-management programs insurers offer that include telephone 
hotlines, audits, and a series of written materials that employers can use to create, develop, or enhance 
their own employment practices materials). 
57. In particular, my prior study notes that insurance company guidance on these issues largely 
focuses on how to avoid litigation as opposed to focusing on EPLI insurers’ often-stated goal of 
providing mechanisms for building a discrimination free work environment. 
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prohibit the insurability of such damages,58 EPLI insurers build discretion into their 
policies and broaden coverage to include punitive damages.59 EPLI insurers insert 
various “most favored venue” clauses into their policies.60 One kind of most 
favored venue clause expressly states that the enforceability of insurance coverage 
shall be governed by the applicable law that most favors coverage for punitive and 
exemplary damages.61 Another approach involves insurance companies listing state 
jurisdictions in their policies that the insurance companies must consult in 
determining insurability.62 If any of the listed states permit punitive damages to be 
insured, then the insurer must treat that jurisdiction as the applicable one for 
purposes of assessing its ability to pay punitive damages.63 
Moreover, many insurers have offshore facilities in Bermuda and London or 
enter into relationships with foreign insurance companies to provide “wrap around” 
policies that will ultimately pay employers’ punitive damages liability.64 Thus, even 
though the law on the books often prohibits coverage for punitive damages, the law 
in action is that these damages are covered by EPLI. Framed as necessary risk 
management and risk aversion, EPLI weakens the ability of state and federal civil 
rights laws to hold employers directly responsible for paying such damages since 
employers now have the ability to transfer these risks to insurers. 
My fieldwork also reveals that insurance companies recontextualize legal rules 
around a nonlegal risk logic that focuses on averting risk and making discrimination 
claims against employers more defensible. Employment progressive discipline 
policies such as performance improvement plans (PIPs), which are often used as 
mechanisms to improve employee performance, are now reframed by insurance 
field actors around managing and averting risk and avoiding a negative inference 
 
58. See Betterley, supra note 48, at 9 (“We understand that there are 16 states that prohibit or 
restrict coverage for either Punitive Damages and/or Intentional Acts . . . .”). 
59. See id. (“Almost every carrier offers separate coverage to fill in such potential gaps in 
coverage, either via most favorable venue wording, or with an off-shore wraparound in a jurisdiction 
such as Bermuda that does not frown upon such coverage.”). 
60. See GRIFFIN ET AL., supra note 52, at 234–39 (providing a comprehensive explanation of the 
relationship between EPLI and punitive damages); Jeffrey P. Klenk, Emerging Coverage Issues in 
Employment Practices Liability Insurance: The Industry Perspective on Recent Developments, 21 W. NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 323, 331–32 (1999) (explaining how “most favored venue” clauses are used by EPL insurers to 
provide coverage for punitive damages claims); see also Jonathan H. Kurens, Insurability Concerns Intentional 
Conduct and Punitive Damages, in THE PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO DEFENSE OF EPL CLAIMS 75, 84–88 
(Ellis B. Murov ed., 2005) (explaining the work-around that EPL insurers use to provide coverage for 
punitive damages). 
61. See GRIFFIN ET AL., supra note 52; Klenk, supra note 60; Kurens, supra note 60. 
62. See GRIFFIN ET AL., supra note 52; Klenk, supra note 60; Kurens, supra note 60. 
63. See GRIFFIN ET AL., supra note 52; Klenk, supra note 60; Kurens, supra note 60. 
64. See Klenk, supra note 60, at 331 (“[S]ome insurers have set up offshore facilities or entered 
into relationships with foreign insurance companies to provide ‘wrap around’ policies that will 
ultimately pay the damages.”); see also Kurens, supra note 60, at 90 (“In order to provide an additional 
layer of coverage protection for punitive damages and intentional conduct when an insured does 
business in jurisdictions that restrict their insurability, employers can negotiate coverage changes to the 
standard Bermuda punitive damage wrap-around policies to specifically address EPL coverage 
concerns.”). 
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from a jury at trial.65 Specifically, while employers’ institutionalized practice is to 
provide PIPs prior to terminating employees, the insurance field discourages using 
PIPs against employees who might be terminated.66 Panelists at conferences spend 
considerable time discussing whether insurance coverage exists for emerging forms 
of liability against employers as opposed to focusing on ways for employers to avoid 
committing legal violations in the first instance.67 
Discussion at the conferences concerning recent U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions is also framed around shifting risk and avoiding liability. For example, the 
Supreme Court in Vance v. Ball State narrows the scope of who constitutes a 
supervisor in sexual harassment cases.68 In Vance, the Court established that a 
supervisor is one who has the ability to take tangible employment actions against 
the victim, such as hiring, firing, disciplining, promoting, and reassigning an 
employee.69 Rather than focusing on the proper role of supervisors, EPLI risk-
management consultants and lawyers steer employers toward avoiding liability and 
defending cases. Risk-management consultants and attorneys suggest that 
employers not have many supervisors, selectively use the term “supervisor,” clearly 
document and communicate levels of authority, and avoid behavior that gives an 
inference that the employee is a supervisor.70 In particular, field actors dissuade 
employers from having lots of employees participate in training programs that could 
suggest an employee is a supervisor.71 Moreover, employers are encouraged to bring 
more motions for summary judgment since the law has narrowed the definition of 
supervisor.72 Thus, unlike Tom Baker and Sean Griffith’s study concerning 
directors and officer insurance loss prevention, insurers do engage in loss 
prevention but do so in a manner that is filtered by risk-management logics.73 
 
65. See Talesh, supra note 49, at 226. 
66. My observations at EPLI conferences revealed that panelists routinely discourage using 
PIPs, especially if an employee has previously made a complaint to an employer. One panelist indicated: 
“PIPs are bad for litigation, 80% of people who receive a PIP end up being fired. Jurors view PIPs as 
a way to set someone up to be fired, especially if the employee raised a complaint or concern earlier.” 
See id. 
67. See id. For example, conferences and training sessions spend considerable time discussing 
workplace bullying, a relatively new workplace issue that is now being increasingly litigated by plaintiffs’ 
lawyers. Although insurance institutions have an opportunity to encourage more lawful conduct in light 
of changing antidiscrimination laws, insurance field actors shift responsibility for fostering a safe and 
positive workplace away from employers by communicating how EPLI provides coverage for 
employers in the event that an employee is found liable for bullying: “Don’t worry. EPLI has a catch 
all for these situations. Bullying claims fall within the definition of wrongful act in the policy—it is a 
wrongful workplace policy or procedure.” Id. 
68. See generally Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013). 
69. See id. at 2439–46. 
70. See Talesh, supra note 49, at 227. 
71. See id. 
72. See id. 
73. TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: HOW 
LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 109–27 (2010) (showing how in 
the directors’ and officers’ insurance context, insurers have an opportunity to engage in loss prevention 
but do not do so). 
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Risk-management and loss-prevention services allow insurers to not just shift 
risk off employers, but also to provide an opportunity for insurers to encourage 
managerialized responses and a formalization of policies and procedures in 
workplace settings. While my data suggest EPLI and the series of risk-management 
services offered with the insurance policy can potentially improve employment 
practices and compliance, they also suggest that EPLI risk-management services 
may at times shape compliance in a way that leans more toward making claims 
defensible rather than fostering a discrimination-free workplace. 
Similar to prior new institutional research, my research reveals considerable 
deference to EPLI by public legal institutions. For example, federal, state, and 
municipal governments adopt the logics of EPLI insurers and encourage, and at 
times require, public organizations and governmental institutions to purchase EPLI. 
In 1997, the U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for U.S. Trustees 
approved EPLI insurance as an “actual, necessary expense” of the trustee pursuant 
to her duties as trustee.74 This was based on the perceived increased number of 
lawsuits being filed concerning employment practices and the need for trustees to 
avert and reduce risk to themselves.75 Final approval of this policy resulted from a 
series of interactions and negotiations between representatives of the National 
Association of Chapter Thirteen Trustees (NACTT) and the United States Trustee 
Program (USTP) in which the NACTT emphasized the need to change USTP 
policy.76 In particular, the USTP formed a subcommittee that listened to 
presentations from EPLI insurers and developed criteria for EPLI insurance.77 The 
subcommittee provided the insurance field an opportunity to communicate its logic 
about the value of EPLI and risk management to government actors, who in turn 
afforded trustees the opportunity to purchase EPLI as a necessary expense. The 
official directive from the Department of Justice encouraged trustees to develop 
managerialized responses such as developing formal compensation policies, 
employee performance reviews, and other standard personnel management policies 
that would lower risk.78 It also urged trustees to attend training and management 
programs administered by EPL insurers: 
 
74. See Memorandum from Jerry Patchan, Dir. of U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Exec. Office for U.S. 
Trustees, to all U.S. Trustees (Dec. 12, 1997) (on file with the U.S. Dep’t of Justice) (authorizing EPLI 
as an actual and necessary expense of the trustee in operation of the trustee’s duties pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 586(e)(1) (2012)). 
75. See id. (“Given the increasing numbers of lawsuits being filed in the employment practices 
area, the lack of insurance protection afforded by current authorized policies, and the need to protect 
the trust, the Subcommittee recommended that EPL insurance be authorized as an actual, necessary 
expense of the trustee.”). 
76. See id. In particular, representatives of the NACTT, concerned with the risk of employment 
practices liability, approached the USTP. See id. 
77. See id. 
78. See id. The Director specifically noted in his memorandum that “premiums should decrease 
as the individual standing trustees institute formal compensation policies, formal employee 
performance reviews and other standard personnel management policies that lower the risk of lawsuits. 
Please work with the trustees in your regions to develop and institute these management practices.” See 
id. 
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[M]any EPL carriers offer loss control seminars; some may even make 
attendance at such a seminar mandatory. I urge you to encourage the 
trustees in your region to attend these free classes. Knowledge of 
employment law and the development of appropriate written policies and 
procedures concerning employment practices will help minimize the risk 
of improper actions.79 
Thus, we see how the content and meaning of regulatory policy and compliance in 
this instance is bottom-up. The insurance field adopts a managerialized conception 
of employment law, which highlights the elaboration of employers’ formal 
structures that demonstrate compliance and rational governance. The insurance 
industry sells this vision by highlighting the risk of not developing policies and 
procedures as well as providing a safety net for employers in the form of defense 
and indemnification insurance coverage. The government adopts this conception 
into its policies by authorizing trustees to purchase EPLI as a necessary expense 
and also urges trustees to attend employment practice training sponsored by 
insurers. Thus, this legal mandate from a governmental body such as the 
Department of Justice looks top-down, but it is really bottom-up and coming from 
the insurance field. 
State governments also rely upon EPLI and simultaneously encourage other 
public entities to obtain such insurance. For example, the Minnesota Department 
of Commerce, the Mississippi Transportation Commission, and the California 
Attorney General’s Guide for Charities advise and authorize public entities to 
purchase EPLI.80 In addition, some county and city governments purchase EPLI.81 
 
79. See id. 
80. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 990(c) (West 2014) (“[A] local public entity may: . . . Insure, 
contract or provide against the expense of defending a claim against the local public entity or its 
employee, whether or not liability exists on such claim . . . where such liability arose from an act or 
omission in the scope of his employment . . . .”); S.B. 2472, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2013) (“The 
Mississippi Transportation Commission, in its discretion, may purchase employment practices liability 
insurance, and may purchase an excess policy to cover catastrophic losses incurred under the 
commission’s self-insured workers’ compensation program . . . .”); EDMUND G. BROWN, ATTORNEY 
GENERAL’S GUIDE FOR CHARITIES 13 (2005) (One of the answers to “Frequently Asked Questions” 
notes that “[i]f the corporation’s employment force is large enough, it may be advisable for the 
corporation to obtain an employment practices liability (‘EPLI’) policy.”). 
81. For example, in California, Alameda and Los Angeles counties have risk management 
policies that include coverage for employment practices liability. See WILLIAM T. FUJIOKA, 2011–2012 
L.A. CNTY. CHIEF EXEC. OFF., RISK MGMT. ANN. REP. 17–18; see also Insurance Programs for the County, 
ALAMEDA CNTY. RISK MGMT. UNIT (Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.acgov.org/cao/rmu/programs/
insurance/county/index.htm [http://perma.cc/2FZF-SDCZ]. New York City’s Housing Authority 
has Public Officials Liability Insurance, which includes EPLI. Regular Meeting, July 30, 2014, OFF. CORP. 
SECRETARY, N.Y. HOUS. AUTH., available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/nycha/downloads/pdf/
board_meeting-calendar_summary_07302014.pdf [http://perma.cc/G67S-LNHM] (“Authorization is 
requested to award the Authority’s $25M (million) Public Officials Liability Insurance Policy, including 
a $10M sublimit for Employment Practices Liability Coverage . . . commencing on August 1, 2014 and 
continuing through July 31, 2015.”); Regular Meeting, July 3, 2012, OFF. CORP. SECRETARY, N.Y. HOUS. 
AUTH., available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/nycha/downloads/pdf/Final_Calendar_Summary
_07032012_Board_Meeting.pdf [http://perma.cc/QC4G-KKEW] (“Authorization is requested to 
award the Authority’s $25M (million) Public Officials Liability Insurance policy, including a $10M 
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Moreover, public secondary schools as well as public universities increasingly 
require EPLI.82 
As EPLI becomes an institutionalized service offered by insurers and 
purchased by public and private organizations, courts follow suit by significantly 
expanding the coverage afforded insureds under EPLI when interpreting coverage 
questions.83 The expansive interpretation of EPLI by courts adds legitimacy to 
 
sublimit for Employment Practices Liability coverage . . . commencing on August 1, 2012 and 
continuing through July 31, 2013.”). 
82. Charter schools in Nevada, as well as public schools that are a part of the Los Angeles 
Unified School District, are required to purchase EPLI. See NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 386.215 (2014); L.A. 
UNIFIED SCH. DIST., REQUIRED LANGUAGE FOR CHARTER PETITIONS—BOILERPLATE (2010), 
available at http://www.calcharters.org/Boilerplate_Language-Final_10-26-10.pdf [http://perma.cc/
8SG3-UJA8]. Universities also have EPLI policies that protect the university against employment 
practice liability. For a sampling of some university practices that require EPLI, see, for example General 
Liability, RISK MGMT. & EVNTL. HEALTH & SAFETY, CAL. STATE FULLERTON, http://
rmehs.fullerton.edu/riskmanagement/Insurance.asp [http://perma.cc/2U22-36HM] (follow “Types 
of Insurance Coverage” hyperlink; then follow “General Liability” hyperlink) (last published Apr. 29, 
2014); UA Employment Practices Liability, SYS. OFF. RISK SERVICES, U. ALASKA, https://
www.alaska.edu/risksafety/b_insurance/insurance-coverage/employment-practices-liab [https://
perma.cc/365B-EVZB] (last updated July 23, 2008); Insurance Programs, BUS. & FIN. BULL., UNIV. CAL. 
(Oct. 1, 2010), available at http://policy.ucop.edu/doc/3520505/BFB-BUS-81 [http://
perma.cc/68QH-HPFL]; Individual and Organization Self-Insurance Plan Including Employment Practices 
Liability Coverage, DEP’T. ENVTL. HEALTH & SAFETY, U.TEX.-PAN AM., available at https://
portal.utpa.edu/utpa_main/dba_home/safety_home/EHS_FILES_pAGE/liability%20practices
.pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y27W-CMGY]; Assessment Rates, BUDGET OFFICE, U. CAL., IRVINE (last 
visited July 8, 2015), http://www.budgetoffice.uci.edu/ratesBO.html [http://perma.cc/5Y4P-R22B]; 
File a Claim, OFF. OF RISK MGMT., U. WASH., http://f2.washington.edu/risk/claim 
[http://perma.cc/ZU32-HAUU]. 
83. Courts have broadened the duty to defend by allowing for an unlimited right to insure under 
the duty to defend for intentional discrimination, even where the duty to indemnify has been limited. 
See, e.g., Starkville Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 772 F.2d 168, 170 (5th Cir. 1985) (“While 
punitive damages themselves may be uninsurable for reasons of public policy, that same public policy 
does not apply to costs and attorney’s fees incurred in a defense against a plea for punitive damages, 
particularly where the defense is successful.”); Marie Y. v. Gen. Star Indem. Co., 110 Cal. App. 4th 928, 
959 (2003) (“[S]ection 533 precludes only indemnification of wilful conduct and not the defense of an action 
in which such conduct is alleged.”); Melugin v. Zurich Can., 50 Cal. App. 4th 658, 669 (1996) (“The 
provisions of section 533 . . . do not relieve [insurer] of the broad duty to defend, even though it would 
have been entitled, in performing that duty, to reserve its right to contest its liability to indemnify”); 
Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hubbard, 162 Cal. App. 3d 939, 946–47 (1984) (“We, therefore, conclude that 
the public policy exclusion for the indemnification of punitive damages does not conclusively establish 
that an insurer has no duty to defend a suit in which the only remaining claim is for punitive damages.”).  
 Courts have also expanded defense coverage of potentially nonindemnifiable acts, where it is 
unclear if such acts are nonindemnifiable at the pleading stage. For example, in Wendel v. Travelers Cas. 
& Sur. Co. of Am., 472 F. App’x 620, 622 (9th Cir. 2012), the court held that an insurance company 
“was bound to provide a defense unless the complaint made it absolutely ‘clear’ that the policy did not 
cover the claim alleged in the complaint . . . .” The insurance company “was not permitted to decide 
unilaterally . . . that its interpretation of the law was likely to be adopted by the Washington Supreme 
Court and deny coverage on that basis.” Id. The court also explained that any exceptions to this rule are 
aimed at benefitting the insured, not the insurer. See id.  
 While courts have consistently held that indemnification claims for discriminatory treatment are 
not covered under EPLI, courts have held that there is indemnification coverage for disparate impact 
claims where any discrimination was unintentional. See Save Mart Supermarkets v. Underwriters at 
Lloyd’s London 843 F. Supp. 597, 606 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (“Unintentional discrimination may be 
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EPLI by authorizing, requiring, or encouraging public institutions to purchase such 
insurance and use the risk-management services that insurers offer. 
In sum, a new institutional approach helps explain how the insurance industry 
influences the meaning of compliance with antidiscrimination laws. In response to 
civil rights laws, insurers created EPLI. This product spread among insurers and 
ultimately employers who ascribed to the uncertain legal risk and heightened 
litigation risk they faced as well as the need to take action to avert such risks. 
Through conferences, training programs, and loss-prevention manuals, EPL 
insurers translate and interpret the meaning of compliance in ways that build 
discretion into legal rules and recontextualize legal rules around a nonlegal risk logic 
that emphasizes averting risk and making discrimination claims more defensible. 
Whereas prior new institutional research highlighted how managerial values 
influence the way organizations understand law and compliance,84 my research 
demonstrates how risk and managerial values work together in the context of 
drafting, marketing, and selling EPLI. 
In turn, public legal institutions such as courts and legislatures appear to have 
adopted the logic of the insurance field as to the value of EPLI and the various risk-
management services and encourage and, at times, require public and private 
organizations to purchase EPLI. Thus, it was not courts or legislatures that initially 
told employers to purchase EPLI. Rather, it was the insurance field that created and 
institutionalized a product and ultimately convinced employers to purchase this 
insurance, and it was the insurance field that motivated the legislature to require, 
authorize, and encourage such insurance in certain instances. The meaning of civil 
rights compliance has thus been constructed at least in part by the insurance field. 
To the extent EPLI and the value-added services induce compliant behavior 
by private and public institutions, requiring organizations to purchase EPLI may 
lead to greater adherence to civil rights goals of workplace equality. However, my 
 
inherently harmful, but a plaintiff need not establish that the insured intended to commit a wrongful 
act in order to recover under such a theory.”); W. Muzette Hill, Employment Practices Liability: The Other 
Year 2000 Problem?, in INSURANCE LAW: WHAT EVERY LAWYER AND BUSINESSPERSON NEEDS TO 
KNOW 293, 312 (1998). (“Many other states follow the New York paradigm in fashioning coverage for 
disparate impact claims and/or vicarious liability claims but either precluding coverage for disparate 
treatment or remaining silent on the issue.”). Moreover, states that bar insurers from covering punitive 
damages indicate that insurers may be required to provide coverage in situations where the employer 
based wrongful conduct was triggered by lower-level employees (as opposed to officers’ and directors’ 
conduct) that the employer did not authorize or ratify. See Hill, supra, at 312–13.  
 Finally, while intentional acts of discrimination are prohibited from being covered by insurance, 
some states have redefined the intentional acts exclusion to require not just an intentional act but also 
deliberate wrongdoing. See, e.g., Manganella v. Evanston Ins. Co., 746 F. Supp. 2d 338, 346–48 (D. 
Mass. 2010), aff’d, 700 F.3d 585, 594 (1st Cir. 2012) (for intentional act exclusion to apply in EPLI case, 
employee must have specific knowledge of the illegality of his or her actions or have knowledge of 
another duty). Thus, by allowing insurance coverage for activities that are not inherently harmful and 
by finding knowledge of workplace policies to be evidence of harmfulness, the courts are expanding 
coverage for businesses regardless of whether the businesses take steps to protect against discrimination 
or not. 
84. See supra notes 29–38 and accompanying text. 
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empirical data suggest that at times there is a disconnect between the moral tones 
that legislators, judges, and lawyers use to discuss antidiscrimination law and the risk 
tones that insurers use that suggest that litigation is inevitable and must be managed. 
B. How the Insurance Field Influences the Meaning of Legislation and Regulation Through 
Intermediary Organizations 
The EPLI case study highlights how EPLI and the accompanying risk-
management services are pathways through which the insurance field shapes the 
nature of civil rights compliance. Whereas conferences, training sessions, and loss-
prevention manuals are locations where organizational values can influence law and 
compliance in the EPLI context, the following section highlights how the insurance 
field uses intermediary organizations such as the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC) and other insurance associations to influence legal rules. 
Consistent with new institutional theories, institutionalized logics and political 
mobilization explain how the insurance field influences the content and meaning of 
insurance legislation and regulation in the United States and foreign countries. 
Insurance regulation in the United States is largely governed by the states.85 
State insurance departments often have broad, legislatively delegated powers to 
enforce state insurance laws, promulgate rules and regulations, and conduct 
hearings to resolve disputed matters. This decentered approach allows each state 
flexibility concerning issues relating to fair pricing of insurance, protecting against 
insurance company insolvency, preventing unfair practices by insurance companies, 
and ensuring availability of insurance coverage.86 States have the discretion to 
approve insurance rates, conduct financial examinations of insurers, license 
companies, agents, and brokers, and monitor claims handling.87 Each state has a 
chief insurance regulator often known as the commissioner, superintendent, or 
director of insurance who is responsible for regulating the insurance markets in a 
state and enforcing the state’s regulatory laws.88 Despite the existence of the state 
 
85. See Kimball, supra note 1, at 473; see also Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United States: 
Regulatory Federalism and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625, 629 
(1999). 
86. See ROBERT H. JERRY II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 22, 95–98 (2d ed. 1996); see 
also Kimball, supra note 1, at 473 (“One can summarize the development of insurance regulation in the 
United States by saying that from an early date there were occasional regulatory efforts by the 
legislatures; that in the 1820s regulatory powers began to be concentrated in the hands of an existing 
state official, acting ex officio; that in the 1850s and 1860s many states concentrated insurance regulatory 
powers in the hands of a special board or an individual designated primarily to control insurance; and 
that ever since the creation of such an insurance department or agency, insurance supervision has been 
rather steadily extended and systematized.”) 
87. See Randall, supra note 85, at 629 (highlighting the various roles state insurance departments 
play). 
88. Therese M. Vaughan, The Economic Crisis and Lessons from (and for) U.S. Insurance Regulation, J. 
INS. REG. 3, 8 (2009) (“Each state has a chief insurance regulator (variously known as the commissioner, 
superintendent, or director of insurance) charged with enforcing that state’s regulatory laws.”); see also 
Randall, supra note 85, at 629. 
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regulatory system, there has been a move toward centralization, uniformity, and 
cooperation in insurance regulation largely driven by the NAIC. 
Formed in 1871, the NAIC is a voluntary association of insurance 
commissioners from each of the fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the 
United States territories.89 The NAIC’s stated goals are to ensure the solvency of 
insurers, protect policyholders, and preserve state regulation as well as the NAIC 
itself.90 Because the NAIC centralizes and unifies insurance regulatory policy across 
states, insurers are not subject to various state laws that are ambiguous with respect 
to compliance and which vary from state to state.91 
The history of the NAIC, therefore, reflects a somewhat contradictory focus 
on preservation of autonomous state regulation and uniformity of regulation. The 
NAIC has centralized many basic regulatory functions and operates as a quasi-
federal agency by attempting to enforce national standards across states.92 Similar 
to federal regulators in other industries, the NAIC performs centralized duties 
including setting forth requirements for standard forms for insurance companies’ 
annual financial statements, coordinating financial examinations of insurance 
companies, rating non-U.S. insurers for the states, providing periodic review and 
accreditation of state insurance departments, and drafting model laws and 
regulations that are often adopted by state legislatures.93 The NAIC, in fact, proved 
instrumental in securing state regulation over insurance. For example, as a result of 
the NAIC’s Financial Regulation and Solvency Accreditation Program, state 
solvency regulation is essentially uniform across states and states undergo regular 
on-site reviews to increase the chance of proper implementation and compliance 
with regulatory rules.94 
The NAIC, however, operates as a quasi-public and quasi-private institution. 
NAIC membership is composed of state officials who are accountable to the 
governors that appoint them or the general electorate. NAIC members also have 
regulatory powers and responsibilities in their states and also have influence in their 
own state’s legislatures. While sometimes thought of as “a group of public officials 
 
89. See Randall, supra note 85, at 629–30; see also Vaughan, supra note 88, at 8. 
90. See also NAT’L ALLIANCE OF AM. INSURERS, NAIC IN TRANSITION: A DISCUSSION PAPER 
ON ISSUES FACING THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS 1, 13–14 (1982). 
91. In 1871, insurance commissioners and representatives from nineteen states met at the 
National Insurance Convention to discuss insurance policy. Randall, supra note 85, at 631–32. 
Representatives at the meeting emphasized the need for uniformity in insurance regulation: 
In a session “remarkable for its harmony,” the commissioners are now “fully prepared to go 
before their various legislative committees with recommendations for a system of insurance 
law which shall be the same in all states—not reciprocal, but identical; not retaliatory, but 
uniform. That repeated consultation and future concert of action will eventuate in the 
removal of discriminating and oppressive statutes which now disgrace our codes, and that 
the companies and the public will both be largely benefited, we have no manner of doubt.” 
Id. at 632. 
92. See id. at 634. 
93. See id. at 634–35 (highlighting the various functions of the NAIC). 
94. See Vaughan, supra note 88, at 9 (explaining some of the successful ventures that the NAIC 
has made toward increasing uniformity across states). 
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imbued with the public trust” or “an instrumentality of the states,” the NAIC 
officially defined itself in 1995 as a private trade organization.95 Thus, the NAIC 
has no power to compel the states or the industry to take action.96 Moreover, 
because the NAIC is a self-governing entity, it is neither accountable to voters nor 
subject to government oversight.97 Although the NAIC plays a central and national 
role in insurance regulatory policy, it has little power to sanction insurers or 
regulators and it is not subject to administrative rules such as the Administrative 
Procedure Act of 1966 and the Freedom of Information Act.98 
As a result, the insurance field has been able to mediate the meaning of 
insurance regulation and policy through its involvement with the NAIC. First, the 
vast majority of the NAIC’s budget comes from assessments of the insurance 
industry.99 Legal analysts have highlighted how the financing of the NAIC allows 
the insurance industry greater influence: 
The industry directly funds the NAIC. Each year the NAIC assesses 
insurance companies a fee, based on premium volume, to file information 
in its centralized databases. In recent years, database fees account for 
approximately half of the NAIC’s revenues. In contrast, state assessments 
account for less than five percent of revenues. As a result, members of the 
industry view the NAIC as part of the industry and accountable to the 
industry. Furthermore, much of the NAIC’s work often appears to be in 
direct response to the industry.100 
Second, the structure of the NAIC not only allows for substantial industry 
involvement in regulatory policy but provides an efficient and centralized 
mechanism for the adoption of policies and laws that the insurance field approves. 
It also provides a place for the insurance field to lobby against NAIC standards if 
committee negotiations prove unfruitful. 
For example, the NAIC’s establishment of accreditation standards for state 
insurance departments highlights how the insurance industry’s institutionalized 
practices can influence legal regulations. After numerous insurer insolvencies in the 
 
95. See Randall, supra note 85, at 638 (highlighting the dual identity of the NAIC and the 
struggles of being thought of as an advocate for public and private interests). 
96. See id. at 638–39 (noting the limited enforcement abilities of the NAIC). 
97. See id. 
98. See Scot J. Paltrow, The Converted: How Insurance Firms Beat Back an Effort for Stricter Controls—
State Regulators’ Alliance Began Tackling Issues; Then, the Boycott Began—A Fateful Dinner in Chicago, WALL ST. 
J., Feb. 5, 1998, at A1 (noting the lack of sanctionable power the NAIC has); see also Randall, supra note 
85, at 638–39 (detailing the quasi-public and quasi-private role that the NAIC plays despite not having 
sanctionable power). 
99. See Paltrow, supra note 98, at A10 (“The NAIC depended on fees paid by the industry for 
90% of its $40 million budget. This not only gave the industry leverage; it also provided a rationale for 
insurers’ argument that the regulators should be accountable to those they regulated.”). 
100. Randall, supra note 85, at 639–40. One commissioner explains the industry in the following 
manner: “‘Money is influence,’ he says, and the amount the NAIC receives from the industry it regulates 
‘is disproportionately high’ compared with the banking association to which he belongs. ‘Departments 
should be funding the majority of the budget.’” Charles E. Schmidt, Jr., NAIC: Under Fire, BEST’S 
REVIEW: PROP.-CAS. INS. EDITION, Jun. 1995, at 34. 
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1980s, the NAIC developed a new accreditation program for state insurance 
departments with the goal of improving solvency regulation and financial 
examinations by individual state regulators and creating consistency among the 
states.101 The accreditation process initially consisted of a group of independent 
individuals knowledgeable about insurance evaluating and reviewing the laws, 
regulations, and standards, and then submitting its report to the NAIC which then 
votes on the state’s accreditation.102 Despite initial agreement among members of 
the NAIC regarding the need for market conduct regulation, the accreditation 
program also did not specify standards and guidelines for market conduct 
regulation.103 Insurance industry officials and state commissioners criticized the 
ambiguity and lack of specificity of standards.104 Moreover, the NAIC had no 
authority to force states to participate in the accreditation process or to monitor 
compliance with Financial Regulation Standards outside the accreditation and 
reaccreditation process.105 In response to industry and state commissioners 
criticisms, the NAIC proposed a series of provisions to tighten standards, required 
establishment of a written policy to cooperate and share all information regarding 
companies with the NAIC and other state regulators, developed a scoring standard 
for accreditation, and threatened potential sanctions for nonaccreditation.106 By 
establishing specific standards as a condition of accreditation, the NAIC attempted 
to bolster state insurance regulation and fend off calls for federal intervention.107 
Ultimately, the NAIC reforms were not successful because the insurance 
industry was able to limit market conduct regulation and the scope of the NAIC’s 
solvency regulation.108 Aided by state legislators who had ties to the insurance 
industry, the insurance field weakened accreditation standards and avoided 
enhanced market conduct regulation through the accreditation program.109 Similar 
to employers and manufacturers in the employment and consumer protection 
contexts, the insurance field successfully argued that market conduct regulation 
 
101. See Randall, supra note 85, at 640–50 (chronicling the regulatory process). 
102. See id. at 646 (highlighting the early stages of the accreditation process). 
103. See 2A MELAHN, ET. AL., PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF 
INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, 1991, at 232 (NAIC report unanimously concludes that market conduct 
regulation was essential to ensure the solvency of insurance companies). 
104. For example, the NAIC standards indicated that sufficient resources must be set aside to 
conduct financial examinations but did not specify what amount of resources would be sufficient. 
105. See Randall, supra note 85, at 644–46 (noting the various approaches the NAIC tried to 
implement). 
106. See id. 
107. Id. at 640–41. 
108. Id. at 641 (“[T]he NAIC, as a private, nongovernmental entity funded largely by the 
insurance industry, is highly susceptible to industry influence. The industry, through various means, 
circumscribed the NAIC’s ability to accomplish significant reform, limiting the scope of solvency 
regulation and preventing essential market conduct regulation.”). 
109. Paltrow, supra note 98, at A1. Approximately one-third of the insurance commissioners 
appointed in 1995 had previously spent time in the insurance industry. Often, commissioners secure 
positions in the industry following their service with the state. It is also common for state legislators 
who have ties to the industry to sit on insurance committees, and only a few states prohibit such service. 
See id. 
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would inhibit their flexibility and discretion with respect to how to conduct 
business.110 The insurance industry withheld paying fees and operating funds 
assessed by the NAIC against insurance companies, engaged in public criticism of 
the program, and lobbied the NAIC to achieve its objectives.111 Many insurers 
boycotted paying the increased fees to the NAIC and argued that the fees were used 
inappropriately to subsidize market conduct activities not related to solvency 
regulation.112 The insurer boycott of paying fees crippled the NAIC and forced the 
NAIC to negotiate with the industry and provide significant concessions. 
Despite the NAIC’s stated commitment to protecting consumers, its studies 
of market conduct initiatives, and its public acknowledgement of the intertwined 
relationship between market conduct and solvency, the NAIC deferred to the 
insurance industry’s institutionalized notions of discretion and flexibility with 
respect to setting rates and failed to establish market conduct accreditation 
standards.113 Consistent with new institutional theory, these institutionalized logics 
shaped what the insurance industry lobbied for. In turn, the insurance industry’s 
political mobilization shaped NAIC policy concerning accreditation: 
The history of the NAIC and, in particular, its continuing failure to 
enhance market conduct regulation or adopt market conduct accreditation 
standards demonstrates that the industry has utilized its power jointly to 
influence and even direct the NAIC’s actions . . . . Although federal 
regulation may not be necessary to guarantee effective regulation of the 
insurance industry, the history of the NAIC suggests . . . a systematic bias 
in favor of the industry.114 
In return for ending the boycott over fees, the regulators agreed to use database fees 
only for solvency regulation.115 The regulators also agreed to curb market conduct 
regulation, establish a liaison committee of industry representatives that meets with 
the regulators’ executive committee on a quarterly basis, and hire a new executive 
vice president who was a former lobbyist of a major insurance company.116 
Moreover, the NAIC began holding annual hearings where industry officials would 
be able to question commissioners on each budgetary item.117 Thus, institutional 
and political mechanisms shaped the nature of insurance regulation at key moments. 
The insurance field also embeds itself within the NAIC’s structure in a way 
that allows insurance field actors to influence the nature of legal rules. For example, 
the NAIC has subcommittees and working groups tasked with influencing 
 
110. Randall, supra note 85, at 655–62. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 656 (highlighting how the insurance industry responded to the NAIC’s growing 
power). 
113. For a comprehensive analysis of how the insurance field weakened accreditation standards, 
see Randall, supra note 85, at 658–60, 647–48. 
114. Randall, supra note 85, at 669. 
115. Paltrow, supra note 98, at A1. 
116. See id. 
117. Id. 
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legislation and regulation. These committees tackle a wide variety of issues, 
including drafting “white papers” and offering recommendations on the future of 
insurance regulation, insurance contacts, and financial instruments.118 Moreover, 
they actively engage in lawmaking by offering amendments to existing laws such as 
the Standard Nonforfeiture Law for Life Insurance as well as make 
recommendations concerning health insurance, accreditation standards, and 
deferring tax assets.119 Rarely are NAIC policies developed without approval from 
the insurance industry.120 The industry advisory committees, resource groups, and 
liaisons for the NAIC provide a mechanism for the insurance field to influence the 
meaning of legal regulation: “At the very least, the structure of the NAIC facilitates 
industry participation in and potential control over the content of various 
regulations.”121 The American Alliance of Insurers (AAI), an insurance industry 
organization, conducted a study in 1982 that concluded that “the NAIC functioned 
primarily as an evaluator and reactor to the work product of the industry advisory 
committee [on the NAIC].”122 By being actively involved in the NAIC, the 
insurance field gains direct influence over the content and meaning of insurance 
laws because the NAIC, as an intermediary, is charged with drafting model laws and 
regulations.123 Moreover, the NAIC strongly encourages states to adopt their model 
standards and laws, including threatening to withdraw accreditation to states that 
do not adopt their recommendations.124 Deference by the federal government to 
the NAIC masks the fact that the insurance industry influences the NAIC’s 
proposals and recommendations at critical stages. 
In particular, the industry’s preference for managerial control and discretion 
 
118. See generally NAIC 2012 Spring National Meeting, NAIC MEETING NOTES (Global Ins. 
Indus. Grp., Ams., Washington, D.C.), Mar. 15, 2012 (highlighting the wide-ranging involvement the 
NAIC has in trying to impact law and regulations). 
119. See id. 
120. See Paltrow, supra note 98, at A1. “Founded in 1871 to help regulators from different states 
devise common approaches, the [NAIC] had long been closely entwined with the industry. Relying 
nearly exclusively on the industry itself for funding, the NAIC seldom did anything to which insurers 
objected. Nine of the past 11 NAIC presidents took industry jobs after they left the association.” Id. 
121. Randall, supra note 85, at 669 n.260. 
122. NAT’L ALLIANCE OF AM. INSURERS, supra note 90, at 65. In particular, the AAI found the 
following: 
If a particular committee was charged with the responsibility to develop a model law or to 
conduct a study, a common response was to appoint an industry advisory committee to 
undertake the bulk of the work. . . . In other situations, the industry might initiate a particular 
project and seek the appointment of an NAIC committee to consider the work products or 
the appointment of an advisory committee to assist in carrying out the work. 
Id. 
123. See Randall, supra note 85, at 625, 629–34, 667–69; see also Sara Marley, Insurers, Legislators 
Criticize NAIC’s Practices, BUS. INS., May 30, 1994, at 1. 
It is time we recognize the NAIC for what it is: a trade association of the state regulators, 
who are not elected nor responsible to anyone (in most cases) except the person who 
appointed them, but who have taken on the role of legislator, executive and judge. I support 
state regulation of our industry, but I think it is time the NAIC quit playing one-upmanship 
with the feds. 
Marley, supra, at 1. 
124. See id. at 2. 
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with respect to risk assessments and policies is afforded considerable deference. For 
example, as part of a solvency modernization initiative, the NAIC in the past few 
years proposed an “Own Risk and Solvency Assessment” (ORSA) process for U.S. 
insurance companies that emphasizes risk management and culminates in a 
comprehensive report of the company’s risk and solvency status.125 This model was 
based on a European proposal set to take effect in 2014.126 While U.S. state 
regulators were very cautious about following a European proposal, the NAIC 
consistently supported focusing insurers on their risk management programs.127 
After receiving feedback from the insurance industry, the NAIC ultimately released 
an ORSA Guidance Manual Exposure Draft in October 2011.128 Interestingly, the 
NAIC relaxed the standards after being convinced by the insurance industry to 
allow insurers the flexibility to emphasize their own policies and procedures in their 
own ORSA.129 Although the ORSA process remained largely intact, the authority 
to order insurance companies to change their behavior or face penalties was 
removed.130 Thus, consistent with new institutional studies, the insurance industry’s 
institutionalized practices drove the NAIC’s regulatory recommendations during 
the political process. Ultimately, the NAIC and state legislatures deferred to the 
insurance field’s constructions of law and compliance. 
These examples of the insurance field’s involvement with the NAIC highlight 
how insurance law is more “bottom-up” than we think. The NAIC operates as a 
centralizing organization that permits the states to circumvent potential federal 
intervention in insurance regulation, and serves to concentrate power. In turn, the 
insurance industry wields considerable political influence over this centralizing and 
intermediary organization and impacts regulatory policy. In this instance, the 
content and meaning of law is being determined by insurance institutions. 
This phenomenon is not limited to the United States. Similar to the NAIC 
context, through a combination of institutionalized logics emanating from the 
insurance field and political mobilization, there is some evidence that the insurance 
field uses intermediary organizations to shape the meaning of legislation and 
regulation in foreign countries.131 
 
125. See David Wicklund & George Christopher, The New Rules of Risk: The NAIC Leans Toward 
Having Insurers Use Solvency II-Inspired ORSA Guidelines to Manage Capital, BEST’S REV., Mar. 1, 2012, at 
65–66. 
126. In particular, the European Union’s Solvency II capital framework was to set regulatory 
capital requirements that are consistent with the economic market. See id. at 65. 
127. See id. 
128. See id. 
129. See id. 
130. See id. Wicklund and Christopher’s article notes: “While most of the key concepts from the 
initial proposal remained in the manual, many of the more prescriptive elements were removed to allow 
companies to emphasize their own policies and procedures in their ORSA.” Id. 
131. One major study of the Canadian insurance industry’s influence noted: “As participants in 
state regulation of their activities, insurance companies are not passive recipients of top-down 
enforcement. Rather they actively shape the state and its form of legislation and regulation. Their 
governance of state governance transpires in the same contexts we have analysed with respect to state 
regulators.” ERICSON, DOYLE & BARRY, supra note 4, at 146. 
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For example, in Canada, insurance associations bring together insurance field 
actors and act as a mechanism through which the insurance field mediates law’s 
meaning. In these settings, the insurance industry communicates and 
institutionalizes a logic anchored around actuarialism, maintaining discretion, 
flexibility, and self-regulation. Similar to the NAIC, industry associations in Canada 
perform multiple roles such as providing a systematic means for developing rules, 
standards, rating criteria, and sanctions, and creating information systems about 
insurance consumers and insurable risks.132 Most importantly, an insurance 
association sees its role as influencing the content and meaning of laws created by 
public legal institutions.133 Industry associations have legal staff that monitor 
legislative policies, engage in close association with insurance companies and the 
legislative counsel, and monitor and interpret legal decisions, including intervening 
and appealing lower court decisions that affect the industry negatively.134 
Working on behalf of the government, insurance directors and officers serve 
on industry associations and government committees that directly interact with state 
regulators concerning insurance matters.135 In this capacity, the insurance industry 
conceptions of the proper degree, amount, and substantive language of legislation 
and regulation are adopted into law by public legal institutions.136 Insurance industry 
involvement in the lawmaking process is so important that the states altered their 
lawmaking process to facilitate greater industry involvement: 
A state regulator . . . . [indicated] that his agency used to develop a position 
paper and send it out to the industry for response, but the practice changed 
to have industry associations participate in developing these papers from 
the outset. He said this approach is best because “if people are not 
 
132. For a comprehensive explanation of the role that insurance associations play in insurance 
regulation in Canada, see id. at 147–48, 151–57. 
133. See id. at 151 (“More and more, governments are seeking constructive partnerships with 
private industry, especially if industry speaks with one voice and in the broad public interest. 
Membership in [the Insurance Bureau of Canada] generally improves the odds that government will 
hear and understand industry positions when it counts, before laws are enacted and regulations drafted.”). 
134. See id. at 151–52. The industry associations act as a legislative or court “watch,” or 
surveillance. “‘Watch’ has become the guiding trope expressing the need for vigilant surveillance. It 
addresses not only what is feared (in the present case, unwanted interference from governments), but 
also what might be a source of favour (in the present case, how governments might serve industry 
interests).” Id. at 151. 
135. See id. at 146–47. Insurance industry involvement includes “cochair[ing] a government 
steering committee on a particular line of insurance with the head of the provincial government 
insurance regulation agency.” Id. at 146. 
136. One CEO noted that major legislation involved the insurance industry defining the 
problem and setting the parameters of the solution and even formal adoption of insurance industry 
language. See id. at 146–47. The political clout of the insurance industry is significant, with lobbyists 
actively negotiating with government officials, and insurance companies exerting a powerful force on 
the political economy. Moreover, industry-appointed councils that are sanctioned by the state have 
significant control over life-agent regulation. See id. at 204. “‘In the prairie provinces, the regulator is a 
council and LUAC and CLHIA appoint the directors . . . Sure makes it a lot easier when the lobbyist 
becomes the regulator!’” Id. (ellipsis in original). 
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prepared to comply with the standards, it’s just like trying to enforce a 
speed limit on the highway, it just won’t happen.”137 
Anchored around risk management and sound actuarial analysis, one piece of 
insurance legislation was adopted “90 per cent in accordance with the industry’s 
framework.”138 Similar to my earlier research in the consumer protection context, 
the insurance field has at times even been able to privatize dispute resolution 
processes. Grievances raised by insureds are now processed by insurance company 
ombudspersons as opposed to neutral state ombudspersons.139 Managerial values 
of maintaining control, discretion, and flexibility also influence the way the 
insurance industry influences the structure of regulation: 
A state regulator of insurance company solvency said in an interview that 
the move to more subjective assessments and self-regulation by insurance 
companies made his agency more dependent on those companies. While 
insurance companies were required to establish more internal governance 
mechanisms, and to disclose how those mechanisms were operating, this in 
turn gave the companies an opportunity to shape the state regulatory agency to the point 
where one meaning of “self-regulation is reliance by entities like us on participants in the 
system.”140 
Similar to the NAIC case study, insurance industry input into the legislative and 
regulatory policy is not merely the result of interest group politics. While the 
insurance lobby is clearly active in Canada, what the insurance field chooses to 
lobby for is shaped by concepts of risk, reliance on actuarial techniques, discretion, 
and flexibility, which are all institutionalized practices within the insurance field. In 
this instance, the insurance associations generate consensus and institutionalize 
insurance industry generated positions and responses to legal institutions. Thus, 
through a combination of institutionalized logics and political mobilization, 
institutionalized ideas about risk and insurance influence the way that public legal 
institutions understand insurance regulation.141 
 
137. Id. at 147. 
138. Id. 
139. One state agency in Canada established an insurance ombudsperson system to address 
consumer complaints. Although housed at the agency headquarters, the main function of the 
ombudsperson’s office was to facilitate creating a system in which each insurance company created and 
operated its own consumer complaint system with its own internal ombudsperson. This program was 
put in place in large part to reduce the number of complaints with which the regulatory agency dealt. 
See id. at 205. 
140. Id. at 147 (emphasis added). In addition, Canada’s insurance industry has been active in 
reform movements that are aimed at reducing government restrictions by the government and in other 
circumstances, increasing restrictions when desired by the industry. For example, the Ontario Red Tape 
Commission received influence from the insurance industry and ultimately adopted much of the 
industry’s logic concerning industry criteria of moral risk and responsibility. See id. at 147–50. The 
insurance industry essentially convinced the regulatory apparatus that stringent government regulation 
was not needed and that the insurance industry played a role in clearing out “unnecessary red tape from 
accumulating.” See id. at 148. 
141. Ericson, Doyle, and Barry describe the way that the insurance field penetrates the 
discourse among public legal institutions as follows: 
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C. How Competing Institutionalized Logics in the Insurance Field Shape the Nature of 
Property Insurance Regulation 
New institutional theories help explain how insurance field actors influenced 
the meaning of property insurance regulation in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries in the United States. In particular, the politics of American 
property insurance regulation and what insurance institutions choose to lobby for 
when attempting to influence legislation were derived from competing and evolving 
field logics operating in the insurance field. I specifically explain how, during the 
1950s, the American property insurance industry shifted from a system of 
associations that relied on shared governance to price-competitive markets and 
insurance companies that directly sold insurance to insureds. This shift 
fundamentally transformed property insurance, bringing a mass-market, large-firm 
system to a sector that had been a more decentralized mix of industry associations, 
bureau companies, independent distributors, and local insurers. 
For much of its history, the property insurance industry institutionalized and 
embraced three logics: (1) companies distributed insurance via networks of 
independent agents; (2) companies and agents governed insurance cooperatively 
through private associations; and (3) states subjected associations to public 
oversight largely through rate-regulation laws passed between 1909 and 1928.142 
“These laws institutionalized the idea of ‘regulated cooperation,’” where 
cooperative rate pricing (fixing) among insurers grounded in actuarial science and 
statistical analysis would tie rates to costs and protect consumers from insurer 
 
A state solvency regulator said in interview that all significant policies evolve through 
industry associations. ‘We’re going to always do what the association says we should do . . . [.] 
The art and science and theory of consultation . . . [involves] power sharing, and sharing and 
development of policy.’ In effect, this allocates controlling influence to the largest and most 
powerful insurance companies, because they dominate the associations and also have the 
biggest stake in issues being addressed. This interviewee made it clear that his regulatory 
agency was therefore also primarily governed by these powerful companies. He figures out 
the distribution of power among the insurance companies that control the association, and 
uses that power to achieve the regulatory outcome at issue. The key industry association 
players, in turn, use state power to achieve the regulation they want, which includes control 
of each other. 
Id. at 152 (ellipses and second alteration in original). 
142. See Schneiberg, New Institutionalisms, supra note 42, at 95–98 (highlighting the central logics 
operating in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century). Private associations have been integral to 
property insurance for over a century: 
Associations first appeared in the 1820s, as companies and agents organized local compacts 
or boards to control markets in a city or town. But in the post-Civil War decades, insurers 
supplemented and then incorporated local boards within state, regional and national bodies, 
forging a nationwide system of more than 1,000 associations. This system of associations 
was the central vehicle for governing the sector through 1950, regulating both final market 
transactions with consumers and intermediate market transactions between companies and 
agents. Associations set premium rates and policy forms, pooled loss data, formed inspection 
boards, created risk classifications, and bargained collectively with consumers and officials 
over the terms and standards of trade. They also governed distribution and the agency 
system: companies associated to license brokers and fix commissions, and agents formed 
boards to fix rules for representation and territory. 
Id. at 96–97. 
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insolvency.143 While this was an institutionalized and ultimately legally codified 
practice, this structure created problems for the insurance market. Insurance 
associations allowed insurers to engage in monopoly pricing and rate 
discrimination.144 Moreover, states shielded insurers from competition and 
delegated public powers to private rating bureaus that regulated cooperation and 
“increased insurers’ capacities for opportunistic collective action.”145 Price 
competition was limited, and vertical integration between insurers and insureds was 
virtually nonexistent.146 In turn, insurance agents inflated prices, raised 
commissions, and passed bad risks to insurers.147 Associations marginalized mutual 
insurers who were excluded from rating bureaus.148 Not surprisingly, consumers, 
regulators, and marginalized insurers grew tired of associations abusing their 
monopoly.149 These phenomena caused increased public scrutiny and calls for 
public intervention.150 
As a result, both consumers and marginalized insurance companies were 
motivated to initiate a change.151 While competitive pricing schemes and direct 
insurance writing by insurers instead of by agents would have been a natural 
solution, the institutionalized logic of the insurance industry association and 
“regulated cooperation” shaped the reforms that followed. The insurance industry 
defended the insurance association on the grounds that insurance was different than 
ordinary commercial transactions in terms of sophistication.152 Accordingly, 
insurance organizations underwent “incremental changes that extended, rather than 
replaced, the logic of associations.”153 Rather than wholesale changes, these reforms 
sought to address the problem of monopoly cooperatively by using associations to 
link insurance prices to risks and to provide consumers with ways to lower rates by 
working within the existing system. The National Board and local inspection 
 
143. See id. at 96–98, 105–07 (charting the history of regulated cooperation in American 
property insurance). 
144. Id. at 110 (“Monopoly rates and discrimination were driving forces for controversy.”). 
145. Id. at 106. 
146. See id. at 107–08 (highlighting the major role that agents played in selling insurance and 
limiting insurers’ direct integration to insureds). 
147. Id. at 108. As opposed to having insurers sell insurance directly to agents, insurance 
associations allowed insurance companies to rely on agents and brokers to solicit clients, assess risks, 
and sell insurance policies. Because it was hard to monitor agencies, “the system thus created a moral 
hazard: It induced and enabled agents to expand coverage, relax underwriting standards, and 
misrepresent claims to win consumer favor, increase volume, and generate commissions.” Id. Insurers 
simply passed these costs on to consumers. Id. 
148. See id. at 106 (noting how the associations marginalized mutual insurers and other groups 
in a way that laid the foundation for an opposition against regulated cooperation). 
149. See id. at 106–10 (charting the strong response from stakeholders who were disadvantaged 
by regulated cooperation). 
150. See id. at 110–11 (“Far from being taken for granted, associations and agents were 
repeatedly subject to controversy, public scrutiny, and hostile state interventions.”). 
151. Id. at 108–09. 
152. See id. (noting that the insurance industry indicated that there was a difference between 
insurance and ordinary trades). 
153. Id. at 111. 
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bureaus also extended the logic of associations through collective bargaining, 
pricing schemes, and prevention associations.154 The National Board and local 
inspection bureaus adopted policies of inspecting facilities and communicating their 
findings to local officials.155 This practice of “schedule rating” combined with 
promises of rate hikes and reductions contingent on inspections tried to address the 
monopoly problem cooperatively. By shielding insurers from competition and 
delegating public powers to private rating bureaus, regulated cooperation increased 
opportunities for opportunistic collective action.156 
Public legal institutions ultimately deferred to the logic of associations 
permeating large insurers. From 1911 to 1928, thirty-three states adopted the logic 
of “association via regulated cooperation” into law and enacted cooperative rate 
regulation.157 Even though there was renewed concern over insurer manipulation 
of rates in the 1920s and 1930s, legislators expanded the insurance commissioners’ 
powers and required insurers to participate in insurer data-pooling programs.158 
Federal and state legislatures responded with a scheme that allowed significant 
deference to an association model. After aggressive political mobilization by 
insurers, Congress in 1945 passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which exempted 
insurance from federal antitrust law.159 Moreover, in 1946 and 1947, the vast 
majority of states passed “All-Industry” laws that permitted and regulated 
associations nationwide.160 Thus, the legislatures affirmed the model of 
scientifically regulated cooperation and afforded insurers considerable control over 
the manner in which rates would be established. 
The property insurance case study both builds upon and refines new 
 
154. See id. at 112. 
155. See id. at 111. 
156. Schneiberg describes how insurers extended the logic of associations: 
[A]ssociations allowed insurers to engage in monopoly pricing and discrimination, 
particularly after they instituted private enforcement schemes in the 1880s. In response, 
consumers and commissioners worked to contain monopoly via regulation, licensing 
associations, rate orders, and disclosure rules. But in shielding firms from competition and 
delegating public powers to private rating bureaus, regulated cooperation increased insurers’ 
capacities for opportunistic collective action, creating a context in which companies could 
learn how to manage the regulatory system. By the late 1920s and 1930s, companies could 
manipulate data and classification schemes, delay rate orders via litigation, and subvert 
safeguards against excessive rates, subjecting consumers to new risks of appropriation. 
Id. at 106. 
157. See id. at 112. See generally Marc Schneiberg & Tim Bartley, Regulating American Industries: 
Markets, Politics and the Institutional Determinants of Fire Insurance Regulation, 107 AM. J. SOC. 101 (2001) 
(highlighting the turn toward rate regulation). 
158. See Schneiberg, New Institutionalisms, supra note 42, at 112. See generally Clarence W. Hobbs, 
State Regulation of Insurance Rates, Part II: Regulation of Rates and Rating Organizations, 28 PROC. CASUALTY 
ACTUARIAL SOC’Y 344 (1942), available at https://www.casact.org/pubs/proceed/proceed41/
41344.pdf [https://perma.cc/FZ2H-DF5E]. 
159. See Schneiberg, New Institutionalisms, supra note 42, at 112 (“After Justice Department 
hearings and a Supreme Court decision to apply federal antitrust law to insurance in the 1940s, officials 
opted again to extend—and universalize—association. In 1945, Congress passed the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, exempting insurance from federal antitrust law.” (citation omitted)). 
160. Id. 
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institutional studies. Rather than ambiguous law, it was market failures and 
controversies surrounding property insurance associations that stimulated a change 
in insurers’ organizational environment. Despite calls for reform, property insurers 
responded by emphasizing the need for discretion and flexibility to control rate 
regulation and pricing through collective pricing schemes and scheduled rating. 
Moreover, they emphasized that regulation through associations was the taken-for-
granted, well-settled industry approach within the property insurance field. 
Eventually, these logics were adopted into legislation in the form of cooperative rate 
regulation. In this instance, property insurance legislation in the form of rate 
regulation looks “top-down” but is actually “bottom-up,” derived and generated by 
the very group—property insurers—that such laws were designed to regulate. 
While fields maintain stability, fields also evolve as new logics take form. From 
the 1940s to the 1970s, property insurance underwent a slow shift away from 
reliance on associations to a logic anchored around price or market competition and 
direct insurance writing by large insurers as opposed to agents. In particular, state 
regulators and the insurance field began to introduce price competition that 
provided some leeway and flexibility by allowing individual insurers to issue their 
own rates and pressure bureaus to reduce rates.161 Although the goal was not to 
displace associations, giving insurers flexibility on rates marginalized associations.162 
State regulators altered laws to help facilitate insurers selling insurance directly to 
consumers and relaxed cooperative rate-fixing.163 
Just as associations were being marginalized, so were insurance agents. 
Vertically integrated insurers became more powerful as large insurers moved into 
distribution and began directly marketing and selling policies to insureds.164 Agents 
became less valued as insurers realized they could expand profits while also cutting 
costs to insureds: “‘Direct writing’ eliminated the independent middleman—his 
commissions and hold over distribution—and subjected risk selection and claims 
to direct control, translating reduced commissions and claim costs into lower prices 
and increased market share.”165 While associations and agents were not eliminated 
from the field, large insurers’ mass marketing abilities reshaped a market that 
previously consisted of associations, bureau companies, and local insurers.166 
Ultimately, independent pricing and market competition replaced cooperative 
 
161. See id. at 98 (charting the impact of price competition on the property insurance market 
and its impact on regulated cooperation). 
162. See id. 
163. Specifically, regulators in the 1950s began allowing limited independent pricing by insurers. 
Insurers increasingly sought to move directly into distribution. See id. at 118. 
164. See id. at 99–108. “As direct [insurers] brought distribution ‘inside’ the firm, they subjected 
transactions to direct bureaucratic control, forcing associations almost completely out of this domain.” 
Id. at 99. 
165. Id. at 98. Vertical integration severely damaged agents’ monopoly over distribution: “Lower 
commissions and claims let direct writers cut prices by 10–40%, capturing nearly half the homeowners’ 
market and over 60% of private passenger automobile insurance.” Id. 
166. See id. at 97–98 (noting that while associations and agents still played a role, large insurers 
transformed the nature of property insurance). 
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rate fixing as central regulating principles as large insurers such as State Farm began 
relying on their own loss data, risk classifications, and inspection routines.167 With 
the benefits being passed on to consumers, many states embraced the insurance 
field’s affinity for price competition by deregulating its pricing practices and 
allowing insurers to compete with respect to rates.168 The NAIC even adopted the 
evolving logic of the insurance field by altering its position and advocating for free 
market competition in its 1974 report, entitled Monitoring Competition: A Means of 
Regulating the Property and Liability Insurance Business.169 As institutionalized logics 
within the insurance field evolved, property insurance regulation changed. Thus, 
once again, in the property context, while the legal regulations looked like they were 
coming from public legal institutions, the content and meaning of legal regulations 
were determined by insurance companies. 
In sum, a new institutional framework that focuses on institutional logics and 
political mobilization best explains how the insurance field was able to impact 
property insurance regulation. In particular, the property insurance case highlights 
how fields have contested or competing logics that are mobilized by different 
groups who choose to form, combine, or transpose logics from other fields or build 
different coalitions. Power and politics are important factors that led to institutional 
change, but what the insurance field lobbied for was often institutionally 
determined by the logics operating in the insurance field. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article offers an alternative theoretical approach for understanding the 
relationship between insurance companies and legal regulation. Whereas most 
accounts discuss the forms and functions of insurance and analyze the conditions 
under which insurance companies impact society, I focus on the processes through 
which insurance institutions construct the meaning of law and compliance. Drawing 
upon new institutional organizational theory, I suggest that conceptions of law and 
compliance that evolve within the insurance field can shape judges’, legislators’, and 
regulators’ understandings of compliance—and ultimately the meaning of insurance 
law. 
Building on prior new institutional work, I reveal how insurance company 
 
167. See id. at 97–99 (describing the rapid transformation that took place in the property 
insurance market). 
168. See id. at 118 (noting that many states moved toward deregulation in order to facilitate 
market competition). New York’s legislature illustrates the logic adopted by many states: 
Those who do not wish to compete in price have conjured many possible evils of open 
competition . . . . During the past 50 years, there has been no evidence in California [or any] 
other jurisdiction that rate competition leads to destructive rate wars. Their memory haunted 
the Merritt Committee a half-century ago, but our own experience and the findings of the 
most recent Congressional study should lay the spectre to rest. 
Id. at 118–19 (alterations in original) (quoting N.Y. INS. DEP’T, THE PUBLIC INTEREST NOW IN 
PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE: A REPORT TO GOVERNOR NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER 17–
18 (1969)). 
169. See id. at 119 (highlighting the NAIC’s blending of insurance with market competition). 
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responses to law and compliance are a complex process that is shaped by 
institutional and political processes and by the flow of risk and managerial logics 
from the insurance field to the legal field. The case studies that I explore show that 
insurance companies are not just rational actors responding to top-down laws and 
regulations, but instead are involved in the social construction of legal meaning.170 
Through institutional and political processes, the insurance field’s ideas about the 
meaning of insurance law and compliance flow into cases, legislation, and 
regulation, and reshape the meaning of law and compliance. In particular, the 
insurance field filters its understanding of law through risk principles and values 
that are well institutionalized among insurance actors. Whereas prior new 
institutional research focuses on managerial values, I show how risk-based values 
encourage organizations to engage in managerial responses. In such cases, risk and 
managerial values work in a complementary manner. Thus, my analysis extends new 
institutional theory analysis of organizational behavior and also refines the analysis 
to better address organizational responses in the insurance context. 
While I do not contend that the insurance industry never responds rationally 
to top-down mandates, existing accounts of how the insurance industry impacts 
society that focus on insurance companies as rational actors miss a part of the role 
that the insurance field plays in influencing public law. Legislation, regulation, and 
even court decisions aimed at regulating the insurance industry are often vague, 
broad, and complex. As opposed to stating clear and coercive rules, laws motivate 
a process through which organizations collectively seek to construct legal meaning. 
As my case studies of EPLI, the NAIC, insurance associations, and property 
insurance demonstrate, these processes are filled with politics as insurance 
institutions and their employees, consumers, and competitors compete for 
constructions of law that favor their interests. However, this process is also 
influenced by institutionalized logics that slowly evolve through the everyday 
processes of insurance organizations as they develop policies and procedures not 
just for risk pooling and transfer, but also compliance. Insurance institutions, 
therefore, are social actors that both respond to and construct meaning within 
insurance fields. Conversely, legal actors such as legislators, judges, regulators, and 
lawyers exist within legal fields that overlap with the insurance field in a variety of 
ways. As insurance and legal actors interact, the meaning of law and compliance 
evolves slowly. Thus, my framework suggests the need to understand law as shaped 
through the processes of institutionalization and political mobilization that take 
place within, and at the intersection of, insurance and legal fields. 
Although some of the examples offered in this Article involve insurance field 
responses to law and forms of compliance that favor insurers over insureds, I do 
not mean to suggest that insurance industry construction of the meaning of legal 
regulations and compliance are always harmful to insureds and other individuals 
 
170. See BAKER, supra note 9, at 2–9 (noting that as society increasingly embraces risk, insurance 
institutions construct legal meaning). 
Talesh production read v3 (clean) (Do Not Delete) 8/4/2015 6:25 PM 
650 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:617 
who encounter law in organizational domains. Institutionalized risk-management 
principles and services and insurance industry construction of legal rules sometimes 
reflect best practices, benefit insureds, and lead to improved compliance. Moreover, 
these structures may infuse insurance institutions with greater awareness of legal 
values and principles. However, it is also important to recognize the process 
through which insurance institutions influence the meaning of legal regulation. 
Moreover, this process may foster forms of compliance that tend to be more 
symbolic than substantive and thus unable to adequately protect insureds, 
consumers, and the public at large. To the extent public legal institutions are going 
to defer to the insurance field’s institutionalized policies, procedures, and practices, 
society needs to more closely interrogate the insurance field’s policies, practices, 
and procedures. 
Of course, these issues that I am raising are unresolved empirical questions. 
More research is needed that especially explores the relationship between insurance 
companies and legal regulation. While cost-benefit efficiency analysis that 
presupposes insurance actors as rational actors is important, scholars need to shine 
a light on the organizational behavior and culture of insurance institutions and 
investigate the various ways in which institutional and political mechanisms shape 
the meaning of law. As opposed to explaining “why” insurance companies respond 
to laws, we need more theoretically-informed empirical research that explores 
“how” insurance companies respond to laws. I encourage insurance scholars to turn 
their research agendas toward inquiries centered around insurance industry 
responses to law in ways that sometimes shape law’s meaning. Shifting insurance 
research in this direction is especially important given the proliferation of public-
private partnerships approved by legislatures and administrative agencies over the 
past twenty-five years that increasingly allow private actors to engage in public 
decision making in a wide variety of contexts.171 At a minimum, my new institutional 
theory of insurance provides the first step because it sets forth a framework to 
understand how insurance company constructions of law influence public legal 
institutions. Hopefully, others will follow and expand upon this approach. 
 
 
171. See Talesh, supra note 27, at 463, 491–92 (discussing the proliferation of public-private 
partnerships and the need for more empirical work concerning under what conditions such 
collaborative governance arrangements work well). 
